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The Utah Wind Working Group (UWWG) believes there are currently opportunities to 
encourage wind power development in the state by seeking changes to the avoided cost tariff 
paid to qualifying facilities (QFs).  These opportunities have arisen as a result of a recent re-
negotiation of Pacificorp’s Schedule 37 tariff for wind QFs under 3 MW, as well as an ongoing 
examination of Pacificorp’s Schedule 38 tariff for wind QFs larger than 3 MW.  It is expected 
that decisions made regarding Schedule 38 will also impact Schedule 37.  Through the 
Laboratory Technical Assistance Program (Lab TAP), the UWWG has requested (through the 
Utah Energy Office) that LBNL provide technical assistance in determining whether an 
alternative method of calculating avoided costs that has been officially adopted in Idaho would 
lead to higher QF payments in Utah, and to discuss the pros and cons of this method relative to 
the methodology recently adopted under Schedule 37 in Utah.   
 
To accomplish this scope of work, I begin by summarizing the current method of calculating 
avoided costs in Utah (per Schedule 37) and Idaho (the “surrogate avoided resource” or SAR 
method).  I then compare the two methods both qualitatively and quantitatively.  Next I present 
Pacificorp’s four main objections to the use of the SAR method, and discuss the reasonableness 
of each objection.  Finally, I conclude with a few other potential considerations that might add 
value to wind QFs in Utah. 
 
 
Summary of Pacificorp Schedule 37 in Utah 
 
Qualifying facilities of up to 3 MW in nameplate capacity (with a cumulative cap of 25 MW) are 
eligible for published avoided cost rates under Schedule 37.  The method used to calculate 
Schedule 37 rates has two parts, depending on whether Pacificorp has sufficient or deficient 
resources.  During periods of resource sufficiency (believed to be through mid-2007), a 
production cost model is used to determine short-run avoided costs.  During periods of resource 




Resource Sufficiency Period 
From 2004 through mid-2007, Pacificorp contends that it has sufficient energy and winter 
capacity, but is capacity-deficient during the summer months.  During that period, avoided costs 
equal the cost avoidance of adding a 10 MW zero-cost resource to the system, plus avoided 
summer capacity costs.  Specifically, Pacificorp conducts two production-cost modeling runs – 
one a baseline run, and the other including a 10 MW zero-cost resource.  The difference in 
overall cost between the two runs, plus the avoided capacity costs of a simple-cycle combustion 
turbine (SCCT) during the summer months, equals the total avoided costs during the sufficiency 
period. 
 
Resource Deficiency Period 
From mid-2007 on, Pacificorp bases avoided costs on the capital and operating costs of a proxy 
plant, in this case considered to be a combined-cycle gas combustion turbine (CCCT) with cost 
and operating characteristics equal to Pacificorp’s new Currant Creek unit (see Table 1 below).  
In order to “accurately” split QF prices during the proxy period into capacity and energy prices, 
however, Pacificorp introduces a SCCT into the picture as well.  Specifically, the fixed cost of a 
SCCT, which is usually acquired as a capacity resource, defines the portion of the fixed cost of 
the CCCT that is assigned to capacity.  Because CCCTs have higher fixed costs (but lower 
operating costs) than SCCTs, however, the fixed costs of a CCCT that exceed those of a SCCT 
are capitalized and assigned to energy payments (“capitalized energy costs”).  This has the effect 
of reducing capacity prices and increasing energy prices relative to what each would have been if 
the proxy CCCT costs had been applied without modification. 
 
Other Notable Provisions 
• Fuel Price Index:  Pacificorp has stated that the Opal pricing point in Wyoming is the 
relevant basis for any gas price inputs in Utah.  It proposed using its own forecast of Opal 
prices, which consisted of a blend of near-term forward prices and a long-term price 
forecast from PIRA.  The Utah Public Service Commission ultimately accepted a natural 
gas price projection that was an average of Pacificorp’s forecast and another proposed by 
the Committee of Consumer Services.  The delivered starting price in 2004 for this 
average gas price projection is $4.98/MMBtu and the average annual nominal escalation 
rate is 0.8%/year from 2004-2023.  Given the EIA’s latest inflation forecast from AEO 
2005, this 0.8%/year nominal escalation rate translates into a -1.59% real escalation rate; 
i.e., the gas price forecast used in Schedule 37 shows gas prices declining over time in real 
or constant dollar terms. 
• Payment Schedule:  Under Schedule 37, a QF has the option of being paid either (A) a 
capacity and average energy price payment, or (B) winter and summer energy payments 
for peak and off-peak hours.  Assuming steady output throughout all hours of the year, the 
two pricing options equal one another.  A wind generator QF that selects option A (the 
capacity and average energy payment) will be paid a reduced capacity payment equal to 
20% of the stated capacity price multiplied by the QF capacity.  This is to account for the 
low capacity value of wind power. 
• Renewable Energy Credits (RECs):  Pacificorp has argued that its ratepayers should hold 
title to the RECs.  The Committee of Consumer Services has agreed that consumers should 
get the RECs, and ultimately advocated for the formation of a task force to study the issue 
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and develop a report by the end of 2004.  I have not been able to find any information on 
this task force or their findings. 
 
 
Summary of the Surrogate Avoided Resource (SAR) Method Used in Idaho 
 
QFs up to 10 MW are eligible for published avoided cost rates in Idaho.  On September 26, 
2002, the Idaho Public Utilities Commission (IPUC) issued Order No. 29124, which modified 
how QF prices would be set in Idaho.  Prior to Order No. 29124, the IPUC considered resource 
sufficiency and deficiency periods in much the same way as is currently done under Utah 
Schedule 37.  Specifically, during resource sufficiency periods, avoided costs were set to equal 
surplus energy costs, while during resource deficiency periods, avoided costs included both the 
energy and capacity costs of the surrogate avoided resource (SAR).  Order No. 29124 eliminated 
consideration of resource sufficiency/deficiency periods (for reasons discussed below), and 
instead based avoided costs over the entire contract period on the energy and capacity costs of 
the SAR.  As is the case in Utah under Schedule 37, the SAR or proxy plant is considered to be a 
CCCT.   
 
One obscure but notable aspect of the Idaho methodology is the inclusion of a “tilting rate” 
intended to account for the fact that the SAR is assumed to have a 30-year life, which is longer 
than the 20-year QF contract.  Because the assumed life of the SAR extends beyond the QF 
contract term, the SAR need not recover its entire capital costs through the QF contract.  In 
Idaho, the tilting rate equals the assumed rate of inflation, and has the effect of reducing the 
assumed plant cost to about 82% of the stated cost (i.e., only 82% of the cost of the SAR is 
recovered through the 20-year QF contract). 
 
Other Notable Provisions 
• Fuel Price Index:  Fuel price assumptions are based on the Northwest Power Planning 
Council’s (NWPPC) medium “east-side delivered” fuel price forecast, and are updated 
each time NWPPC updates its forecast.  Rather than adopt the forecast as is, the specific 
methodology employed is to average the price of the three years leading up to and 
including the current year,1 and then escalate that averaged starting price at the annualized 
rate of escalation inherent over the entire forecast period.  This method results in a 
“straight line” fuel price input that is nevertheless based on the NWPPC forecast.  The 
most recent delivered starting price in 2004 for this average gas price projection is 
$5.10/MMBtu and the average annual nominal escalation rate is 2.3%/year.  Given the 
EIA’s latest inflation forecast from AEO 2005, this 2.3%/year nominal escalation rate 
translates into a -0.12% real escalation rate; i.e., the gas price forecast used in Idaho shows 
gas prices essentially flat over time in real or constant dollar terms. 
• Payment Schedule:  Published avoided costs in Idaho do not break out capacity and energy 
payments.  Instead, a single non-levelized $/MWh payment stream (for non-fueled QFs) is 
presented, along with the equivalent levelized price for contracts ranging in length from 1 
to 20 years.  It should be noted, however, that the IPUC has allowed Idaho Power to apply 
“seasonalization factors” to the non-levelized price stream in order to convert it from a 
                                                 
1 The purpose of the three-year averaging is to avoid the possibility of a very high-priced single year resulting in a 
high starting price that skews payments upwards over the duration of the contract. 
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single price each year to three different prices depending on season.  Assuming steady 
output throughout the year, the weighted average seasonal price will equal the published 
non-levelized price.  For wind generators with variable output, however, the seasonal 
weighting will likely somewhat reduce the weighted-average price received.  For example, 
in a recent PPA between Idaho Power and a wind QF, seasonal weighting reduced the 
published price by about $1.15/MWh on a levelized basis over 22 years (see Figure 5, and 
discussion surrounding it, below). 
• Renewable Energy Credits (RECs):  RECs are retained by the QF, and are not transferred 
to the utility.  Indeed, the IPUC has ruled that RECs would not be a recoverable cost, so 
the utilities have little interest in them.  Hence, the sale of RECs may represent an 




Comparison of Utah Schedule 37 to Idaho SAR Methodology 
 
The main methodological differences between Utah Schedule 37 and the SAR method employed 
in Idaho are (1) the former’s consideration of resource sufficiency and deficiency periods; (2) the 
former’s use of a SCCT to explicitly disaggregate total avoided costs into energy and capacity 
payments; and (3) differences in the way wind generation is de-rated to account for low capacity 
value (i.e., assignment of 20% of full capacity value in Utah, versus seasonal weighting of the 
published price in Idaho).  Since – absent access to Pacificorp’s production cost model – I cannot 
replicate the resource-sufficient portion of the Schedule 37 avoided costs, the rest of this memo 
will focus primarily on the proxy (i.e., resource-deficient) portion of Schedule 37 avoided costs.  
Differences in methodology and input assumptions during the deficiency period will be 
highlighted. 
 
During the resource deficiency period, the SAR and Schedule 37 methods are similar, in that 
both make use of a surrogate or proxy plant, with comparative cost and performance 
characteristics listed in Table 1.  In addition, Table 1 shows the capital-carrying charge (called a 
“payment factor” in Utah) used to amortize the plant cost, the weighted-average cost of capital 
(which serves as the discount rate for levelization purposes), and the fuel price projections.  Not 
shown in Table 1 are the cost and performance characteristics of the SCCT used in Utah to 
allocate total avoided costs to capacity and energy payments (use of the SCCT does not appear to 




Table 1.  Comparison of Proxy Plant (Utah Schedule 37) and SAR (Idaho) 
 Utah (2004) Idaho (2004) 
Plant Cost 
($/kW) $726 
$738 ($604 after application of 
tilting rate) 
Fixed O&M 
($/kW-year) $9.72 $11.90 
Variable O&M 
($/MWh) $2.57 $3.11 
Heat Rate 
(Btu/kWh) 7,626 7,100 
Capacity 
Factor 85% 92% 
Plant Life 
(years) 30 30 
Capital Carrying 
Charge* 8.71% (Pacificorp) 12.60% (Pacificorp) 
WACC 
(Discount Rate) 7.52% (Pacificorp) 10.27% (Pacificorp) 
Fuel Price 
Projections 
Average of Pacificorp and 
Committee of Consumer 
Services forecasts:  
$4.98/MMBtu in 2004, 
escalating at 0.8%/year 
Based on NWPPC forecast:  
$5.10/MMBtu in 2004, 
escalating at 2.3%/year 
*Called a “Payment Factor” in Utah 
 
Based partially on the assumptions listed in Table 1 (again, Table 1 does not include assumptions 
in place during the resource sufficiency period, or assumptions concerning the SCCT used to 
allocate avoided costs into capacity and energy payments during the resource deficiency period), 
Figure 1 compares Pacificorp’s published non-levelized and levelized avoided costs in Idaho (as 
approved on December 1, 2004 in Order No. 29646) to those published in Schedule 37 in Utah 
(the “capacity and average energy price payment” option is shown, assuming full capacity 
payment).  In both cases, the avoided costs shown are applicable only to non-wind QFs, as a 
wind QF in Utah would earn a reduced capacity payment (just 20% of the full value) while a 
wind QF in Idaho would likely receive a seasonal-weighted price that is a bit lower than depicted 
in Figure 1.  As shown, for the same utility (Pacificorp), non-wind QFs earn about $10/MWh 






























































 Idaho SAR Method Non-Levelized Avoided Costs
 Idaho SAR Method Levelized Avoided Costs
 Utah Schedule 37 Non-Levelized Avoided Costs
 Utah Schedule 37 Levelized Avoided Costs
Figure 1.  Published Avoided Costs for Non-Wind QFs in Idaho and Utah (Pacificorp) 
 
Based on the methodology described in Idaho Order No. 29124, the variables described in the 
documentation leading up to Idaho Order No. 29646, and consultation with staff at the Idaho 
PUC, I have been able to replicate the non-levelized and levelized avoided costs approved by the 
Idaho PUC on December 1, 2004 and published in Order No. 29646.  With the correct 
methodology in hand, it is a trivial matter to change the input assumptions from those used in 
Idaho to those that are currently used in Utah under Schedule 37 (i.e., switching the inputs from 
the second to the first column of Table 1). 
 
Figure 2 shows the results of plugging Utah-specific parameters (i.e., those used in the 
calculation of Schedule 37 avoided costs during the resource deficiency period) into the SAR 
methodology as employed in Idaho.  As was the case in Figure 1, the avoided costs depicted in 
Figure 2 are those that would be earned by non-wind QFs able to generate flat blocks of power 
throughout the year, such that any seasonal weighting would not devalue the published price 
(under the SAR method) and the QF would earn the full capacity payment (under Schedule 37).  
As shown, the gap between the SAR method and the Schedule 37 method narrows considerably 
once consistent, Utah-specific input assumptions are used in each method.  Whereas the gap 
between levelized prices shown in Figure 1 was about $10/MWh, under common, Utah-specific 
assumptions the gap declines to about $4.25/MWh ($52.87/MWh vs. $48.62/MWh).  This 
suggests that for non-wind QFs, differences in input assumptions (e.g., fuel price projections, 
capital carrying charges, etc.) account for about $5.75/MWh of the total levelized price 
difference between Idaho and Utah, while differences in methodology (i.e., consideration of 



























































 Utah SAR Method Non-Levelized Avoided Costs
 Utah SAR Method Levelized Avoided Costs
 Utah Schedule 37 Non-Levelized Avoided Costs
 Utah Schedule 37 Levelized Avoided Costs
Figure 2.  SAR and Schedule 37 Avoided Costs for Non-Wind QFs Under Common Utah-
Specific Assumptions (Pacificorp) 
 
The avoided costs shown in Figures 1 and 2, however, are applicable only to non-wind QFs that 
are either able to earn the full capacity payment under Schedule 37, or that will not be negatively 
impacted by seasonal weighting of the published price under the SAR method.  Under both 
methods, wind QFs will earn avoided costs that are lower than those shown in Figures 1 and 2.  
Specifically, wind QFs opting for the “capacity and average energy payment” pricing option 
(i.e., the pricing option shown in Figures 1 and 2) under Schedule 37 will only earn 20% of the 
full capacity payment, while – based on recent experience in Idaho (discussed later and depicted 
in Figure 5) – a wind QF under the SAR method will likely earn about $1.15/MWh less on a 
levelized basis due to seasonal weighting of the published price.   
 
Figure 3 shows the impact of these two mechanisms used to de-rate the capacity value of 
variable wind generation.  As mentioned above, based on recent experience in Idaho, we assume 
that the seasonal weighting of the SAR method will reduce the levelized price by about 
$1.15/MWh to $51.7/MWh.  More significantly, the reduced 20% capacity payment lowers the 
Schedule 37 levelized avoided costs by about $10/MWh to $38.65/MWh.  Thus, for a wind QF, 
the Schedule 37 levelized avoided cost is about $13/MWh below the seasonal-weighted SAR 
method using Utah-specific assumptions (and is about $19/MWh below the seasonal-weighted 



























































 Utah SAR Method Non-Levelized Avoided Costs
 Utah SAR Method Levelized Avoided Costs
 Utah Schedule 37 Non-Levelized Avoided Costs
 Utah Schedule 37 Levelized Avoided Costs
Figure 3.  SAR and Schedule 37 Avoided Costs for Wind QFs Under Common Utah-
Specific Assumptions (Pacificorp) 
 
In summary, the difference in levelized avoided cost received by a wind QF in Idaho and Utah 
can be broken down as follows:  ~$5.75/MWh due to differences in input assumptions (e.g., fuel 
price projections, capital carrying charges, proxy plant cost and performance characteristics); 
~$4.25/MWh due to consideration of resource sufficiency/deficiency periods in Utah but not 
Idaho; and ~$9/MWh due to differences in the capacity value assigned to wind (i.e., wind is de-
rated by ~$10/MWh in Utah through reduced capacity payment, and by ~$1/MWh in Idaho 
through seasonal weighting of the published price).  Hence, capacity value considerations 
account for nearly half of the overall difference in avoided costs for wind QFs in Idaho and Utah, 
with the remainder split more or less evenly between other methodological differences and 
varying input assumptions. 
 
One could question whether the 20% capacity value ascribed in Utah is too low.  Indeed, in the 
July 20, 2004 Order on Reconsideration in Docket No. 03-035-T10, the Utah PSC notes that 
Pacificorp has stated that the seasonal- and time-differentiated pricing option provides wind 
generators operating at a 30% capacity factor with a partial capacity payment equal to about 35% 
of the full capacity value embedded in the seasonal- and time-differentiated prices.  In other 
words, wind operating at a 30% capacity factor effectively earns about 35% of the implicit 
capacity value paid to the proxy plant assumed to be operating at an 85% capacity factor (i.e., 
30%/85%=35%).  In comparison to the ~35% capacity value that a wind QF would apparently 
implicitly receive if opting for the time-differentiated pricing option, the 20% capacity value 
explicitly assigned to wind under the “capacity and average energy payment” pricing option 
appears to be low. 
 
Furthermore, a comparison of the “capacity and average energy payment” schedule (assuming 
20% capacity value for wind) to the alternative of seasonal on- and off-peak pricing also 
available under Schedule 37 also suggests that the 20% capacity value assigned to wind may be 
too low.  Figure 4 shows that, assuming 20% capacity value for wind, the “capacity and average 
energy payment” schedule is only slightly higher than the stream of off-peak energy payments 
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available under Schedule 37.2  In fact, if a wind QF in Utah expects as little as 10% of its annual 
generation to be on-peak, it will still be better off choosing the time-differentiated payment 
schedule as opposed to the “average energy and capacity” schedule.  Since, in Utah, Pacificorp 
considers 56% of all hours to be on-peak,3 and because a wind project with a 30% capacity factor 
might actually be generating at least some energy (though not necessarily peak output) in 70%-
80% of all hours, choosing the time-differentiated peak/off-peak pricing option appears to be a 
good bet.  This bias towards the time-differentiated pricing option can perhaps be interpreted as 
an indication that the 20% capacity value used in the “capacity and average energy payment” 
pricing option is too low.4
 
igure 4.  Comparison of Both Pricing Options Available to Wind QFs Under Schedule 37 
acificorp Objections to the SAR Method 
 Oregon, Docket UM 1129 is currently investigating various aspects of avoided costs and QF 
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 Average Energy + 20% Capacity Payment
 On-Peak Winter (Schedule 37)
 On-Peak Summer (Schedule 37)
 Off-Peak Winter (Schedule 37)







contracts.  As part of that proceeding, various parties have discussed the appropriateness of the 
SAR method.  Below I quote and paraphrase Pacificorp’s primary objections to the use of the 
SAR method in Oregon, as contained in the testimony of Mark Widmer (Pacificorp), starting o
 
2 Note that seasonal differences between on- and off-peak prices only persist through 2007; after that, there is a 
single on-peak and off-peak price applied throughout the year, regardless of season. 
3 In Utah, the percentage break-down between on- and off-peak hours is as follows:  37% winter on-peak, 19% 
summer on-peak, 29% winter off-peak, 15% summer off-peak.  Thus, 67% of all hours are considered to be winter 
and 33% are summer, while 56% of all hours are considered to be peak and 44% are off-peak. 
4 Given that a wind QF in Utah would likely be better off choosing the seasonal- and time-differentiated pricing 
option, one might reasonably question why we have instead depicted the “capacity and average energy” pricing 
option in Figures 1-3.  We did this because in order to have shown the seasonal- and time-differentiated pricing 
option in Figures 1-3, we would have had to make various assumptions about the seasonal and diurnal generation 
profile of both wind and non-wind QFs in Utah.  While do-able, such assumptions would have introduced a degree 
of uncertainty into the analysis that we preferred to avoid (and note that for the same reason – a preference for 
certainty over uncertainty – a wind QF may prefer the “capacity and average energy payment” pricing option, all 
else equal). 
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page 20 of http://www.pacificorp.com/Regulatory_Testimony/Regulatory_Testimony42622.pdf).




acificorp Objection #1:P   “The SAR methodology produces a single $/MWh price that applies 
 
Discussion:  With respect to Objection #1, the Idaho PUC has allowed the avoided cost 
ed 
to all QF generation regardless of season or time of day.”  Thus, the SAR method allocates some
capacity benefits in all hours and does not differentiate between peak and off-peak hours.  This 
does not provide an incentive for QF’s to deliver during peak hours.  In Docket N. 03-035-T10, 
the Utah Commission adopted peak and off-peak pricing (which is consistent with the current 
method – up for revision – in Oregon). 
 
payment determined by the SAR method to be weighted seasonally, such that the weight
average of all seasons equals the published avoided costs (assuming steady output from the 
QF throughout the year).  For example, the Idaho PUC recently approved a QF contract 
between the Fossil Gulch wind project and Idaho Power.  Page 7-9 of that contract (see 
http://www.puc.state.id.us/fileroom/electric/ipc-e-04-19/app.pdf) lists the base price, the
“seasonalization factors” applied, and the amount of wind generation projected to be 
delivered in each season.  Idaho Power will pay Fossil Gulch 73.5% of the published 
cost in Season 1 (March, April, May), 120% of the published avoided cost in Season 2 (July, 
August, November, December), and 100% of the published avoided cost in Season 3 (June, 
September, October, January, February).  If the wind QF generated the same amount of 
power in each month of the year, the weighted-average price it received would equal the
published avoided cost.  Because of seasonal variation in the wind profile, however, Fossi
Gulch can expect to receive a weighted average price that is about $1.25/MWh below the 
published avoided cost on average ($1.15/MWh less on a levelized basis).  Figure 5 shows






































































 Published Idaho Power QF Price
 Fossil Gulch Wind Project, Projected Seasonal-Weighted-Average Price
$55.40 vs. $54.24/MWh levelized over 22 years at 7.52%
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This example of a real-life application of the SAR method in Idaho counters, at least with 
respect to seasonal variations, Pacificorp’s contention that the SAR method applies a single 
price “regardless of season or time of day.”  There also does not appear to be any reason why 
the SAR published avoided cost could not be further dissected into peak and off-peak 
periods.   
 
In addition, QF’s in Utah already have the option to be paid either a “capacity and average 
energy” price – which does not differentiate between peak and off-peak periods – or 
alternatively seasonal peak/off-peak pricing.  Furthermore, after 2007, the seasonal pricing in 
Schedule 37 is no different for winter or summer anyway (though peak and off-peak prices 
do differ).  As such, this argument against the SAR method is not as effective in Utah – 
where a non-time-differentiated pricing option already exists under the “average energy and 
capacity payment” option – as it might be in Idaho or Oregon. 
 
Finally, it perhaps deserves note that the Idaho PUC recently approved a measure that will 
penalize QFs that fail to deliver energy within a range of 90% to 110% of their forecasted 





within the SAR method of calculating avoided costs – for QFs to deliver power as projecte
cificorp Objection #2:  “The SAR method fails to accurately calculate capacity and energy.” 
e SAR method is based solely on the capital and O&M costs of a proxy combined cycl
bustion turbine (CCCT).  Howe
 
Th e 








a  energy payments. 
 
t 
into capacity and energy payments is superior to all others.  This does not appear to be a 
, 
cle combustion turbine (SCCT).  Pacificorp argues that the capacity component of avoided 
sts should therefore be based on the fixed costs of a SCCT, not a CCCT.  A SCCT is less 
ficient than a CCCT, however, which results in higher energy costs.  Pacificorp acknowledges 
at this extra energy cost should be included in the energy component of avoided costs as a 
apitalized energy adjustment.”  In other words, relying solely on a CCCT to calculate avoide
pacity and energy costs will overstate the capacity payment and understate the energy 
yment; Pacificorp proposes to solve this problem by using a SCCT for capacity payments, an
odified CCCT (modified such that energy costs are higher) form
Discussion:  Pacificorp’s Objection #2 is not really arguable – i.e., Pacificorp is correct tha
the SAR method does not accurately calculate capacity and energy payments (in fact, the 
SAR method does not even attempt to split avoided costs into these components).  
However, Pacificorp’s objection presupposes that a methodology that splits avoided costs 
foregone conclusion in Utah, where one of the pricing options agreed to under Schedule 37 
(i.e., the time-differentiated option) does not explicitly split out capacity and energy 
payments.  Pacificorp appears to be accepting of the Schedule 37 time-differentiated option
and as noted above under the discussion of Objection #1, there does not appear to be any 
reason that avoided costs calculated under the SAR methodology could not be seasonally 
(as they are in Idaho) or diurnally weighted to arrive at a time-differentiated price that 




Pacificorp Objection #3:  “The SAR method includes a fixed price escalator for gas prices that 
is not adjusted to track changes in gas supply and demand.  It assumes that gas prices will start at 









er advocate’s) forecasts.  It is impossible to say whether either 
of these forecasts is “better” than the other.  We at LBNL have argued that in fact, utilities 
should be using forward prices – not price forecasts – in instances such as this, and have 




’s if gas prices increase at less than the assumed escalation rate. 
Discussion:  With respect Objection #3, it should be noted that in Idaho, both the st
gas price and the fixed escalation rate applied to it over time are derived from the NWPPC’
natural gas price forecast (basis East-Side Delivered).  Moreover, the Idaho PUC has foun
(in Order No. 29124) that avoided costs should be updated each time the NWPPC issues a 
new gas price forecast.  As such, this methodology is not quite as primitive or baseles
Pacificorp’s comments imply.  Since any attempt to calculate future avoided costs will 
necessitate making assumptions about future natural gas prices, this issue really boils dow
to which forecast or gas price projection to use.  In Idaho, they use a modified (simplified)
form of the NWPPC gas price forecast.  In Utah, they use an average of two parties’ 
(Pacificorp’s and the consum
found over the past five years that forward prices have generally exceeded most price 
forecasts (implying that avoided costs would have been higher if forwards had been used 
instead of forecasts).5  This is an important issue that all avoided cost methods must deal 
with – i.e., the SAR method cannot be singled out on account of i
 
cificorp Objection #4:  “The SAR method, as recently modified by the Idaho Commission, 
 longer considers the utility resource surplus period.  Effectively, the modified method 
sumes that there is no surplus period and that the utility needs additional resources 
mediately.  This can result in additional subsidy in that avoided costs will reflect a capacity
yment in periods of sufficiency when the QF purchases are not actually avoiding capaci
ditions.”   
Discussion:  Pacificorp is correct in Objection #4 – i.e., the SAR method as practiced
Idaho does not consider resource sufficiency/deficiency periods.  Also note that PGE’s 









rennan_testimony.pdf) also criticizes the SAR method on these grounds (i.e., that it ass
that utilities are always capacity-deficient).  Specifically, PGE states that ignoring the 
resource sufficiency period is inconsistent with least-cost planning, and that the SAR 
approach (as modified in Idaho) effectively replaces the utility resource planning proces
umes 
s 
with a separate plan. 
 
While the utilities have a point, it is nevertheless still possible to dispute the benefits of 
considering resource sufficiency/deficiency periods in the first place.  For example, on 
September 26, 2002, the Idaho PUC issued Order No. 29124 (see 
http://www.puc.state.id.us/search/orders/dtsearch.html, type in 29124), which modified the 
                                                 
5 See, for example, http://eetd.lbl.gov/ea/ems/reports/54751.pdf. 
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existing avoided cost methodology and established the methodology in use today.  One of 
the primary modifications was to abolish consideration of resource sufficiency/deficiency 
periods.  In arguing for abolishment, Commission Staff presented nine reasons (quoted 
lar filings by the utilities 
y’s 
r 







) Utilities always plan to be surplus in the short-term, at least for as long as it takes to 
 
rce balance.  The cumulative effect of many 




eco ostpone the construction or acquisition of such a resource.  
g 
into ll be 
at a




accura em represent a “silver bullet” against the SAR method, and all 
verbatim here): 
 
1) “Establishment of utilities’ first deficit years requires regu
followed by Commission Orders.  None of the utilities have made a filing to update its 
first deficit year since the first deficit years were last established in 1996. 
2) It is unclear whether determination of a first deficit year should be based on a utilit
energy needs or capacity needs. 
3) When a utility becomes deficit depends on the conditions assumed for planning.  Wate
conditions and res
4) Load forecasts are one half of the surplus/deficit equation.  Load forecasts are prepar
entirely by each utility with little or no oversight.  Utilities can easily manipulate the
load forecasts to produce a desired result. 
5) Utilities increasingly rely on market purchases.  Should long-term contracts that do not 
begin for several years be counted as resources in determining first deficit year? 
6) The difference between “surplus” energy rates and “SAR-based” rates is not as great as
it used to be; therefore, there is less justification for two different bases for parts of t
avoided cost
7
acquire new resources.  Having too large of surplus can be as problematic as being 
deficit.  Avoided cost rates should not provide incentives for a utility to increase its 
surplus period. 
8) The addition of a PURPA project, particularly if it is less than 10 MW, does not have a
large impact on a utility’s load-resou
PURPA projects could have a significant impact, but the capacity of PURPA projects 
has historically been small. 
If surplus
prices to be used during a utility’s surplus period poses some difficulty because of 
recent extreme variations in market prices.” 
In general (along the same lines as the seventh comment listed above), it seems that if a 
ity perpetually believes that it is currently in a period of resource sufficiency (as i
presumably must if it is able to reliably serve its customers), then it might never consider 
 construction of a CCCT (the proxy plant) to be economical – i.e., it might always be 
nomically advantageous to p
Obviously, such a situation cannot persist indefinitely without the utility eventually gettin
 trouble with respect to resource needs.  As long as (or if) it does, however, QF’s wi
 disadvantage.  This is perhaps more of a general observation than a specific argument 
mary, while Pacificorp’s four main objections to the SAR method are in some cases 




input fficiency considerations, and ~$9/MWh due 
to different methods of de-rating wind’s capacity value), simply arguing for one method over 
an






ng on an average annual 




“tilting rate” that reduces the amount of capital costs recovered through the QF contract – 
en 
stigating why capital carrying charges differ so much between 












r .  
I
                                                
ur of them can be argued, in some cases just as persuasively.  Again, though, given the rel
own in avoided cost differences between Utah and Idaho (~$5.75/MWh due to vary
assumptions, ~$4.25/MWh due to resource su
other may not be as fruitful as focusing on those specific assumptions or methodological 
ments that could potentially be adjusted to increase avoided costs paid to wind QFs in 
sed on the analysis above, those assumptions or methodological elements that seem most
ulnerable” in Utah include: 
 Wind’s Capacity Value:  As discussed above, something higher than 20%, and perhaps a
high as 35%, may be warranted. 
 Fuel Price Projections:  As noted above, the current natural gas price forecast used in 
Schedule 37 shows gas prices in real or constant dollars declini
• Capital Carrying Charge:  As shown earlier in Table 1, there is a sizable difference 
between the capital carrying charge used in Utah (8.71%) versus Idaho (12.60%).  In a 
nutshell, the capital carrying charge is used to “spread out” the full capital cost of the proxy 
plant into a levelized annual cost.  In other words, in Utah, each year 8.71% of the total 
proxy plant cost contributes to that year’s avoided costs.  In Idaho, each year 12.60% of the 
surrogate plant cost contributes to that year’s avoided costs.  Thus, in Idaho, a significantl
larger percentage of the proxy plant’s cost is being included in avoided costs each year 
is the case in Utah, leading to higher avoided costs.  Recall, however, that Idaho employs a 
this will serve to mitigate somewhat the impact of a higher capital carrying charge.6  Ev
so, it might be worth inve
Idaho and Utah (for the same utility, no less). 
Resource Deficiency Periods:  S
justify the abolishment of resource sufficiency/deficiency considerations may find tracti
in Utah. 
ther Potential Considerations 
dition to tinkering with or arguing for certain avoided cost methodologies or avoided cost 
t assumptions, the Utah Wind Working Group may wish to consider pursuing two other 
ible sources of revenue:  renewable energy credits and carbon credits. 
enewable Energy Credits (RECs):  Recently, the FERC ruled that unless a QF contract 
xplicitly allocates ownership of renewable energy credits (RECs) to the utility, the RECs 
emain the property of the QF.  In Idaho, the PUC has also ruled that RECs stay with the QF
n Utah, this issue is apparently under study by a task force that was expected to report its 
 
6 For example, it was noted above that the tilting rate leads to only 82% of the capital cost of the surrogate plant 
being recovered through the QF contract.  Since 82% of 12.60% equals 10.3%, perhaps 10.3% is effectively the 
“correct” capital carrying charge to use when making comparisons with Utah.  Additional investigation and analysis 
would be needed to clarify this, however. 
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 Carbon Risk:  Pacificorp has explicitly modeled and accounted for the risk of future carbon 
regulations in its IRP process.  Given that the utility has acknowledged and incorporated 
 process, it may be possible for non-carbon QFs to 
extract some incremental value in exchange for their ability to mitigate carbon risk.  While I 
 of fossil-fueled 
resources when evaluating bids from long-term, all-source solicitations.  Specifically, the 
 
rbon-
indings at the end of 2004.  If not transferred to the utility or its ratepayers, RECs could 
rovide an additional source of revenue to QFs i
ltimately rules that RECs are transferred to the utility or its ratepayers through a QF 
ontract, this could provide grounds for QFs to negotiate a higher avoided cost rate. 
•
carbon risk into its resource planning
am not aware of any direct precedent for such a measure, it is perhaps noteworthy that in 
December 2004, the California Public Utilities Commission issued an order requiring the 
state’s IOU’s to incorporate a “greenhouse gas adder” into the bid price
utilities must add between $8-$25/ton of CO2 (equates to approximately $3-$9/MWh for a 
CCCT) to the bid price of fossil-fueled resources, for evaluation purposes only (the GHG 
adder will not impact the price paid to the winning bidders).  Xcel Energy is another utility 
that has incorporated externality values into its bid evaluation process for all-source 
solicitations.  In other words, consideration of carbon risk is currently affecting resource 
decisions and favoring carbon-free resources in utility solicitations.  Given this reality, it
does not seem entirely unreasonable to seek QF pricing that also differentially favors ca
free resources such as wind power. 
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